

CORRUPTION, INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: AN ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS

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ABSTRACT: Corruption adversely affects economic growth through political institutions and governance. The nexus between corruption, political institutions, governance and economic growth is quantitatively less understood. This paper analyses the effects of corruption and governance on economic growth focusing on the effects of voice and accountability, government effectiveness, rule of law, political stability and absence of violence and regulatory quality. This paper uses panel data from 110 emerging countries of the world for 15 years from 1999 to 2014 applying the panel fixed effects and random effects estimation. The empirical results show that corruption impacts economic growth negatively while good governance is associated positively with economic growth. The effect of regulations and rule of law on economic growth is positive while space for voice and accountability and political stability and absence of violence have insignificant effects on growth rate. Democratisation and decentralisation would improve economic growth in emerging economies.

KEYWORDS: Corruption, governance, economic growth, emerging economies, panel fixed effects and random effects estimation.

JEL CODE: C23, D72, D73, H11, O47

INTRODUCTION

Corruption is a global phenomenon which is endemic to governments all over the world. The World Bank cites corruption as the single most important obstacle to development. It is a subversive force that can topple the most entrenched regimes and it corrodes currencies, markets and investments. Corruption exists in a wide array of illicit behaviour, such as bribery, extortion, fraud, nepotism, graft, speed

money, pilferage, theft, and embezzlement, falsification of records, kickbacks, influence peddling, and campaign contributions. While corruption is commonly attributed to the public sector in India, it also exists in other sectors under the sphere of governance, such as political parties, private business sector and NGOs. Corruption poses a major threat to economic growth by reducing the public and private sector efficiency when it enables people to assume positions of power through patronage rather than ability and merit. Even the scale of corruption in institutions and agencies outside the government and political system are no less. Corruption in private business, autonomous institutions/enterprises, civil society and media are widespread and equally affect a nation's social and economic health. Corruption undermines the rule of law, democratic governance, accountability and sustainable development. Corruption harms political and economic institutions that are already fragile and contributes to failures in governance and development. Corruption breaches the contract between citizens and public officials, and this has grave consequences for government functioning. Indeed, corruption is a consequence of a collapse of governance and is also a cause of its continued failure.


There is no uniform definition of corruption because what is regarded as corruption depends on the existing laws and regulations guiding certain actions. Some countries define corruption in the broadest form while others legislated on the narrow definition of the term corruption. However, it is generally accepted that corruption means the misuse or the abuse of public office for private gain. According to Tanzi (1998), corruption is the intentional noncompliance with arm's length relationship aimed at deriving some advantage from this behaviour for oneself or related individuals. Transparency International defines corruption as "the misuse of public power for private benefit". Irrespective of how a nation perceives the definition of corruption in its economy, corruption is a deterrent to economic growth and social development of a nation, hence a stumbling block to its well-being and progress.

Table 1 and Figure 1 present the level of corruption around the world in the year 2018 where the corruption perception index (CPI) scale ranges from 0 to 100 according to the Transparency International. Denmark is the least corrupted with a CPI score of 88 and Somalia is the most corrupted country with a CPI score of 10 among 180 countries around the world in 2018. Figure 2 presents the rank of India in CPI ranking above 75 in recent years. Figure 3 presents the trend in corruption index scores over the years in India. The level of corruption in India has increased from a low CPI score of around 25 in 1996 to a high score of about 41 in 2011, and thereafter declining in recent years. Still, the level of corruption in India is high, and in 2018, India ranks 78 among 180 countries with a score of 41 out of 100 in 2018.

Table 1: Least and Most Corrupt Countries in the World, 2018

<i>Low corruption countries</i>			<i>High corruption countries</i>		
<i>Rank</i>	<i>CPI</i>	<i>Country</i>	<i>Rank</i>	<i>CPI</i>	<i>Country</i>
1	88	Denmark	73	43	South Africa
2	87	New Zealand	78	41	India
3	85	Finland	87	39	China
3	85	Sweden	89	38	Sri Lanka
3	85	Switzerland	105	35	Brazil
3	85	Singapore	117	13	Pakistan
7	82	Norway	138	28	Russia
8	82	Netherlands	176	14	Yeman
9	81	Luxembourg	176	14	North Korea
11	80	Germany	178	13	Syria
22	71	USA	178	13	South Sudan
25	68	Bhutan	180	10	Somalia

Source: Transparency International.

**Figure 1: Level of Corruption Around the World, 2018**

Source: Transparency International.




Figure 2: Trend in Corruption Perception Index of India

Source: Transparency International.




Figure 3: India's Corruption Perception Index (Scores)

Source: Transparency International.

Frequently, the political and governance systems of a country are cited as the root cause of corruption. Good governance is widely considered to be the solution to most of the problems the country is facing, including corruption. There is no universal acceptance of what constitutes a good governance mechanism, but a sort of agreement does exist on the broad elements of governance as processes and institutions by which authorities are exercised in a country or a region. Good governance covers all aspects of the interface between individuals and business on one hand and government on the other. The Planning Commission of India in its 11th plan says that governance should cover the following distinct dimensions:

- Constitutionally protected right to elect government at various levels in a fair manner, with effective participation by all sections of the population.

- The governments at all levels must be accountable and transparent. Closely related to accountability is the need to eliminate corruption, widely seen as a major deficiency in governance.
- The government must be effective and efficient in delivering social and economic public services, which are its primary responsibilities.
- Local governments (panchayats and municipalities) should be empowered to function efficiently for local economic development and social justice.
- The rule of law must be firmly established.
- The entire administrative system must function in a manner which is to be fair and inclusive.

It is a matter of great concern that the world's largest democracy, India, with a comprehensive constitution and a vibrant civil society has performed so badly on internationally accepted governance indicators. It is also perplexing to see that the largest democracy and third-largest economy with rapid economic growth and many-fold increase in budgetary allocations for social sector expenditure, India's ranking in the world in terms Human Development Index (HDI) remains pathetic, ranking lower than even poor and underdeveloped countries. It seems that something must have gone terribly wrong in the democratic governance of the country, for the country has not been able to redistribute fruits of its democracy and rapid economic growth to the majority of its population. Due to corruption and/or otherwise, benefits of growth have remained accumulated in a few influential hands. That is why perhaps India has the dubious distinction of having some of the largest numbers of billionaires amidst the largest number of the poor in the world. Indeed, an increase in the number of billionaires is indicative of the country's robust macroeconomic performance, but at the same time, a disproportionate decline in poverty is certainly suspicious and is indicative of corruption in governance.

Corruption and governance lie on a continuum but occupy opposite poles, and in fact, corruption is the antithesis of good governance. Whereas governance, with its end goal of creating a good government, aims to serve the interest of the largest number of people, corruption, through the use of public office and resources, serves the narrow interest of few families and allies. Good governance with transparency and accountability is fundamental for democracy. Good governance entails an administration that is sensitive and responsive to the needs of the people and is effective in coping with emerging challenges in society by framing and implementing appropriate laws and measures. It includes strict rules for accountability. Good governance largely depends on the extent to which the general citizenry perceives a government to be legitimate i.e. committed to improving the general public welfare, deliver public services, and equitable in its conduct, favouring no special interests or groups. Hence, democratic governance is a necessary requirement to fight corruption.

Generally, some factors which by their very nature (e.g. rigid system, social immobility) cause corruption and some intermediary and accentuating factors (e.g. ignorance, illiteracy, procedural) which provide impetus to corruption. Some of the causative factors of corruption are:

- political factors such as voice and accountability, government effectiveness, political stability, absence of violence.
- institutional factors such as rule of law and regulatory quality.
- social inequalities of patriarchy, caste, language, region and religion.
- centralised democracy, undemocratic dynasty culture, opaque and unaccountable political parties.
- colonial bureaucracy with rigid and discretionary powers, and deeply rooted patronage system.
- ineffective judicial system.

Some of the intermediary/accentuating factors of corruption are:

- outdated rules of governance of police, private sector, religious institutions and NGOs).
- uninformed citizens with widespread illiteracy, unawareness of rights, roles and responsibilities.
- large scale public sector and public procurement policies.:
- lack of self-accountable media and civil society.

Given that there exists a large scale corruption and the level of corruption affects growth and development, and there are evidence that corruption affects economic growth through political institutions and governance, and there are various institutional and regulatory mechanisms to combat corruption, an understanding of the nexus between corruption, political institutions and economic growth in the modern context is warranted. Hence, this paper investigates the effect of corruption and governance on economic growth around the world. Specifically, this paper estimates the effects of voice and accountability, government effectiveness, rule of law, political stability and absence of violence and regulatory quality, and corruption on economic growth. In the empirical analysis, this paper uses panel data on 110 emerging countries of the world for 15 years from 1999 to 2014). The data are collected from the Political Risk Services (PRS) and the World Bank. The panel fixed effects and random effects models are estimated and the appropriate model is identified by the Hausman test.

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Research on the causes and consequences of corruption is not a recent phenomenon; it has a long history in economics dating back to at least with a seminal contribution

of the rent-seeking literature. This section focuses on the econometric analyses on the consequences of corruption for governance and economic growth.

Akai, Horiuchi and Sakata (2005) estimate the short-run and long-run effects of corruption on economic growth in the US during the period 1991-2000 using a state-level cross-section data and applying the two-stage least square (2SLS) method. Theoretical studies suggest that government failure is a function of corruption, and corruption should have a detrimental effect on economic growth in the long-run, and at the same time, corruption may counteract government failure and promote economic growth in the short-run, given exogenously determined suboptimal bureaucratic rules and regulations. The paper measures the rate of economic growth for various periods, short (1998-2000), middle (1995-2000) and long (1991-2000), and separately estimate the effect of corruption on growth using previously uninvestigated state-level cross-section data. The 2SLS estimates, with a carefully selected set of instruments, shows that the effect of corruption on economic growth is indeed negative and statistically significant in the middle and long-spans but insignificant in the short-span.

Del Monte and Papagni (2001; 2007) analyse the long-run consequences of bureaucratic corruption by estimating the effect of corruption on the productivity of public investment in 20 regions of Italy using a dynamic panel data approach. A model of economic growth with public inputs to private production and private inputs to public goods is formulated in which the bureaucrats buy from the private sector for the production of public goods with some degree of discretion. The aim of an illegal agreement between the exchanging parties is to profit from the lack of information and the governments fight corruption through costly public purchases monitoring. The extent of corruption is a decision variable in the maximisation of expected revenue. This model finds support in the panel data analysis of the Italian regions. The effect of corruption on public investment productivity is significant and distinct from a direct negative effect of corruption on the growth rate.

Akinlabi, Hamed and Awoniyi (2011) examine the causality and effect of corruption on foreign direct investment inflow and economic growth in Nigeria. Using the time series data covering 1990 and 2009 and employing the Granger causality test and OLS method, the paper finds there is an inverse relationship between FDI inflow and corruption in Nigeria. A large volume of FDI inflow is associated with a low level of corruption, the exchange rate depreciation and inflation rate are significant determinants of FDI inflow to Nigeria. Also, there is a significant positive relationship between FDI inflow and economic growth in Nigeria.

Adenike (2013) study the impact of corruption on economic growth in Nigeria using annual time series data for the period 1980-2009 applying regression, Granger causality test and impulse response function methods. The empirical results show

that in Nigeria corruption per worker exerts a negative influence on output per worker directly and also indirectly on foreign private investment, expenditure on education and capital expenditure per worker. Furthermore, the study reveals that there is a one-sided causality where the direction of influence runs from output per worker to corruption per worker. The study recommends a strategy of actions in various sectors in combating corruption in the Nigerian economy as against a single action, the establishment of the anti-corruption agency.

Zidi and Dhifallah (2013) study governance and economic growth for a group of 30 developing countries over the period 1998-2011. The paper investigates the impact of the quality of political institutions on economic growth linking corruption, governance and economic performance using panel data method. The estimated results show that improving the quality of political institutions decreases the level of corruption and boosts sustainable economic growth in developing countries. The paper concludes that governance increases government accountability to citizens and also strengthens their commitment to policies chosen especially in the fight against corruption.

In India, Dutta, Kar and Roy (2013) study the effect of corruption on the informal sector using a cross-section data for 20 Indian states and applying the OLS method. India has a huge informal sector and the extent of corruption in every sector is remarkably high. In fact, stifling bureaucratic interference and corruption at every stage of any activity is one of the main reasons behind high participation in informal and unregulated sectors. Also, for economies characterised by high inequality and poverty, corruption is a useful tool for the government to pacify social unrest, allowing a lower level of governance with substantial corruption in the system. Indeed, the estimated empirical results show that higher corruption increases the level of employment in the informal sector. Further, the higher the level of lagged state domestic product, the positive impact of corruption on the size of the informal sector is nullified.

DATA AND METHODOLOGY

The main objective of the study is to examine the impact of corruption and governance on economic growth. Towards this end, this paper uses panel data for 110 emerging countries over 15 years from 1999 to 2014. This paper considers seven variables for empirical estimation viz. growth rate, corruption and governance variables voice and accountability of the citizens, political stability and absence of violence, effectiveness of government, quality of regulations and rule of law. The data on growth rate is obtained from the World Bank World Development Indicators and the data on corruption, political institutions and governance are collected from the Political Risk Services Group database. The panel estimation methods of fixed effects and random effects methods are used in the empirical analysis. Panel data contains the same countries in each cross-section

repeated over time. Unlike the separate time series and pooled cross-section estimations, the panel data controls for the country-specific unobservable heterogeneity and time-invariant variables, and the correlation between the omitted variables and the error term.

The Political Risk Services (PRS) or the “Coplin-O’Leary Country Risk Rating System is the methodology developed by William D. Coplin and Michael O’Leary at the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University with the U.S. Department of State, the Central Intelligence Agency, and other government agencies and major multinational corporations. Political Risk Services is the most widely accepted system of completely independent political risk forecasting. For each country, data are collected in a specific format across 17 categories which are then converted into 0-3 scores (low, very high or best, worst). The numerical scores are then converted to create alphabetical ratings and are reported for each country.

PANEL DATA METHOD

In the fixed effects model, the individual heterogeneity is assumed to be constant or fixed and uncorrelated with other explanatory variables. These fixed effect variables, which are indicative of the economic behaviour of countries, are used to control each country being different from another. If individual fixed effects are omitted, then the omitted variable bias will cause biased and inconsistent coefficient estimates of the explanatory variables. Therefore, the fixed effects model takes the time-invariant country effects in the constant term of the regression. The panel data model can be specified as:

$$y_{it} = \alpha + \beta x_{it} + \lambda_i + u_{it} \quad (1)$$

The fixed effects model is specified as:

$$y_{it} = \alpha_i + \beta x_{it} + u_{it} \quad (2)$$

where α_i includes the country specific fixed effects (λ_i).

When the individual country effects are not controlled and are uncorrelated with explanatory variables, then the country effects can be specified as a country-specific random element and included as a regressor in the estimating equation. The random effects model can be specified as:

$$y_{it} = \beta x_{it} + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (3)$$

where $\varepsilon_{it} = (\lambda_i + u_{it})$, the individual fixed effects is a part of the error term. The random effects panel model is estimated by the generalised least squares method.

As both the fixed effects and random effects models can be estimated on the panel data, the appropriate model for the given data is decided by the Hausman specification test. The Hausman test is based on the fact that the random effects

model should be preferred as it takes into account the time effects (between variations) and the random country-specific effects whereas in the fixed effects model considers only cross-section (within variations) and time effects are assumed to be constant. If the zero-correlation OLS assumption [$Cov(\lambda_i, x_{it}) = 0$] holds, then the Hausman test is to test the difference in the estimates of fixed effects model versus random effects model for significance. The null hypothesis of the Hausman test is constrained by insignificance of fixed effects regression model. The Hausman test is specified as:

$$H = (\hat{\beta}_{RE} - \hat{\beta}_{FE})' \Omega^{-1} (\hat{\beta}_{RE} - \hat{\beta}_{FE}) \sim \chi_k^2 \quad (4)$$

where Ω^{-1} is the variance-covariance matrix and the test statistics is distributed as chi-square. If the chi-square statistic rejects the null hypothesis (random effects regression), the fixed effects model is the choice otherwise random effects occur.

EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

In the empirical analysis of the effect of corruption and governance on economic growth, the annual growth rate of the country is the dependent variable. The definition of the variables used in the study and their descriptive statistics are presented in Table 2. In the 110 emerging economies, the average growth rate is 2.8 percent and the mean corruption score is 0.38. All the governance variable scores are above average, except for the effectiveness of government.

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Variables

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Description</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std. dev.</i>
GR (annual growth rate)	Growth rate of real GDP of countries (2010 base)	2.780	5.627
CR (level of corruption)	Extent of public power for personal interests and private profit in terms of wealth and gain (0-1 score)	0.386	0.145
VA (voice and accountability)	Ability of a country's citizens to participate and choose the government, based on a number of indicators measuring various aspects of the political process, civil liberties and human rights (0-1 score)	0.595	0.227
PV (political stability and absence of violence)	The likelihood that the government in power will be destabilised or overthrown by unconstitutional means and/or violent or threatened by the public such as terrorism (0-1 score)	0.711	0.114
GE (government effectiveness)	Aspects of quality and availability of public service, the bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the independence of the administration of political pressure and the credibility and transparency of the government's reform commitments and policies (0-1 score)	0.473	0.226

contd. table 2

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Description</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std. dev.</i>
RQ (regulatory quality)	Policies and measures of bank supervision and monitoring as well as the perception of the blockage imposed by excessive regulation in areas such as foreign trade and business climate (0-1 score)	0.630	0.202
RL (rule of law)	Indicators that measures the confidence of citizens in accordance with the laws and rules of society (0-1 score)	0.568	0.192
Obs.			1750

Table 3 presents the correlation between the variables. The correlation coefficients show that corruption and government effectiveness are negatively associated with annual growth rate and the other governance variables are positively correlated with the growth rate. There is a positive correlation among the governance variables and between them and growth rate and even corruption.

Table 3: Pair-wise Correlation Coefficients of Variables

<i>Variable</i>	<i>GR</i>	<i>VA</i>	<i>PV</i>	<i>GE</i>	<i>RQ</i>	<i>RL</i>
VA	0.032	1.000	-	-	-	-
PV	0.037	0.334	1.000	-	-	-
GE	-0.010	0.536	0.275	1.000	-	-
RQ	0.069	0.500	0.396	0.475	1.000	-
RL	0.054	0.314	0.421	0.391	0.371	1.000
CR	-0.059	0.391	0.351	0.448	0.340	0.424

Table 4 presents the fixed effects and random effects panel regression estimates for the impact of corruption and governance on economic growth. In both fixed effects and random effects estimates, the effect of corruption on economic growth is significantly negative, clearly indicating that corruption is harmful to the growth of the economy. An increase in corruption reduces the growth rate by 3.5 to 4.15 percent. Political stability and absence of violence has a statistically significant positive effect on the growth rate, where the poor governance by the government has a negative effect on economic growth. An increase in political stability and absence of violence would increase growth by 4.5 unit. A unit increase in government effectiveness will decrease the growth rate by 4 units. In the random effects model, the effects of the quality of regulation and rule of law are significantly positive. An increase in regulatory quality will increase the economic growth rate by 2.15 percent and an increase in rule of law affect the annual growth by 1.75 units.

Table 4: Panel Fixed Effects and Random Effects Estimates of Corruption and Governance on Economic Growth

Dependent variable: Economic growth rate

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Fixed effects</i>	<i>Random effects</i>
CR	-3.574** (2.37)	-4.156*** (3.38)
VA	1.718 (0.90)	0.919 (0.56)
PV	4.477** (1.98)	1.725 (1.04)
GE	-4.015* (1.86)	-1.629 (1.63)
RQ	1.817 (1.62)	2.215** (2.35)
RL	-0.680 (0.33)	1.754* (1.67)
Constant	1.097 (0.55)	0.910 (0.40)
σ_u	2.192	1.476
σ_ε	5.391	6.388
ρ	0.141	0.070
F-value/chi ²	8.23	30.47
Prob>F/chi ²	0.00	0.00

Note: Absolute t-values in parentheses. *** significant at 1 percent level ** significant at 5 percent level * significant at 10 percent level.

The Hausman's specification test result for the appropriateness of the fixed effects and the random effects models is presented in Table 5. The null hypothesis being the preferred model is random effects vs the alternative hypothesis being the acceptance of fixed effects model. It basically tests whether the unique errors (u_i) are correlated with the regressors, and the null hypothesis is they are not. The Hausman test leads to the conclusion that the random effects model is more suitable for the data as the test result shows p-value as 0.617 which is higher than 0.05.

Table 5: Hausman Specification Test

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Fixed effects</i>	<i>Random effects</i>	<i>Difference</i>	<i>Std. error</i>
CR	-3.574	-4.176	0.602	0.839
VA	1.718	0.923	0.791	1.449
PV	4.477	1.801	2.676	1.568
GE	-4.015	-1.557	2.458	1.904
RQ	1.817	2.213	-0.397	0.727
RL	-0.680	1.761	2.440	1.721
Constant	1.097	0.910	0.188	1.672

Hausman test: H_0 : difference in coefficients not systematic.

β_{FE} : consistent under H_0 and H_1

β_{RE} : efficient under H_0 and inconsistent under H_1

Test: $H = (\beta_{FE} - \beta_{RE})' (V_{FE} - R_{RE})^{-1} (\beta_{FE} - \beta_{RE}) \sim \chi^2 = 5.35$

Prob.>chi²= 0.62

The Breusch Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier test for random effects model is given by: $GR_{it} = \beta x_{it} + u_i + \varepsilon_{it}$. The null hypothesis in the LM test is that variance across entities is zero i.e. no significant difference across units (no panel effect):

$H_0: \sigma_u^2 = 0$ or correlation between ε_{it} and $\varepsilon_{is} = 0$.

$H_1: \sigma_u^2 \neq 0$ or random effects method is applicable.

The LM is distributed as a chi-squared distribution. The estimated Breusch Pagan LM test result presented in Table 6 shows LM at 0.0001, meaning there is a significant difference across the countries and thus random effect model is accepted over the fixed effects regression.

Table 6: Breusch-Pagan LM Test for Random Effects Estimation
Dependent variable: Growth rate

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Variance</i>	<i>Std. dev.</i>
x	36404.1	190.757
u	29.164	5.400
e	37377.77	193.333
Test: var(u) = 0	$\chi^2 (01) = 13027.40$	Prob. > $\chi^2 = 0.00$

CONCLUSION

The quality of political institutions is a rule of the game more important in determining the form of the economic behaviour of countries. Similarly, corruption has been one of the main institutional failures characterising emerging countries, and there is no doubt that corruption has a detrimental impact on economic performance. The quality of governance, coupled with corruption, is significant in explaining the performance of economies. This paper has focused on empirically analysing the interaction between the quality of political institutions, corruption and economic performance in 110 emerging countries over a period of 15 years from 1999-2014. The data are collected from the World Bank and the Political Risk Services database. Empirically, this paper followed the fixed effects and random effects panel regression methods of estimation. The estimated results show that corruption impacts economic growth negatively while good governance is associated positively with economic growth. The effect of regulations and rule of law on economic growth is positive while space for voice and accountability and political stability and absence of violence have insignificant effects on growth rate. Therefore, it is clear that corruption is detrimental in countries with low-income levels that are less integrated into the global economy and are generally the most populous. The weak and undemocratic political institutions and lack of democracy increase corruption. Thus, these institutional failures that characterise developing countries tend to destabilise their long-term economic growth. Hence, a great deal of democratisation and decentralisation would be better for improving economic growth in the emerging economies.

APPENDIX

Table 16A List of 110 Emerging Countries Included in the Study on Corruption, governance and Economic Growth

Albania	Czech Republic	Latvia	Saudi Arabia Senegal
Algeria	Dominican Republic	Liberia	Serbia
Angola	Ecuador	Libya	Sierra Leone
Argentina	Egypt	Lithuania	Singapore
Armenia	El Salvador	Madagascar	Slovakia
Azerbaijan	Estonia	Malawi	Slovenia
Bahamas	Ethiopia	Malaysia	South Africa
Bahrain	Gabon	Mali	Sri Lanka
Bangladesh	Gambia	Malta and Gozo	Sudan
Bolivia	Ghana Guatemala	Myanmar	Suriname
Botswana	Guinea	Mexico	Syria
Brazil	Guinea Bissau	Moldova	Taiwan
Brunei	Guyana	Mongolia	Tanzania
Bulgaria	Haiti	Morocco	Thailand
Cameroon	Honduras	Mozambique	Togo
Chile	Hong Kong	Namibia	Trinidad and Tobago
China	Hungary	Nicaragua	Tunisia
Colombia	India	Niger	Turkey
Democratic Republic	Indonesia	Nigeria	Uganda
Congo (Kinshasha)	Iran	Oman	Ukraine
Republic of Congo	Iraq	Pakistan	United Arab Emirates
(Brazzaville)	Israel	Panama	Uruguay
Costa Rica	Jamaica	Papua New Guinea	Venezuela
Cote D' Ivoire	Jordon	Paraguay	Vietnam
Croatia	Kazakhstan	Peru	Yemen United
Cuba	Kenya	Philippines	Zambia
Cyprus	Kuwait	Poland	Zimbabwe
		Romania	
		Russia	

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